Incentivized Federated Learning and Unlearning
Ningning Ding, Zhenyu Sun, Ermin Wei, Randall Berry

TL;DR
This paper addresses incentivizing users in federated learning to stay engaged and not unlearn their data, proposing a game-theoretic incentive mechanism that improves model performance and reduces server costs.
Contribution
It introduces a novel incentive mechanism for federated unlearning, modeling user interactions and private information to enhance engagement and unlearning efficiency.
Findings
Users gain higher payoffs with unlearning incentives.
The proposed mechanism reduces server costs by up to 53.91%.
Unlearning incentives are essential for retaining valuable users.
Abstract
To protect users' right to be forgotten in federated learning, federated unlearning aims at eliminating the impact of leaving users' data on the global learned model. The current research in federated unlearning mainly concentrated on developing effective and efficient unlearning techniques. However, the issue of incentivizing valuable users to remain engaged and preventing their data from being unlearned is still under-explored, yet important to the unlearned model performance. This paper focuses on the incentive issue and develops an incentive mechanism for federated learning and unlearning. We first characterize the leaving users' impact on the global model accuracy and the required communication rounds for unlearning. Building on these results, we propose a four-stage game to capture the interaction and information updates during the learning and unlearning process. A key…
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Taxonomy
TopicsPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in Data · Stochastic Gradient Optimization Techniques · Cryptography and Data Security
