Coevolutionary dynamics of population and institutional rewards in public goods games

TL;DR

This paper models adaptive reward mechanisms in public goods games, showing how coevolution of cooperation and reward strength can lead to stable cooperation and sustainability in social dilemmas.

Contribution

It introduces a coevolutionary model where reward strength adapts based on population cooperation levels, revealing stable coexistence and minimal reward thresholds for full cooperation.

Findings

Stable coexistence of cooperation and reward strength identified

Full cooperation achievable with minimal reward levels

Adaptive feedback rewards promote long-term stability

Abstract

In social dilemmas, individuals face a conflict between their own self-interest and the collective interest of the group. The provision of reward has been shown to be an effective means to drive cooperation in such situations. However, previous research has often made the idealized assumption that rewards are constant and do not change in response to changes in the game environment. In this paper, we introduce reward into the public goods game and develop a coevolutionary game model in which the strength of reward is adaptively adjusted according to the population state. Specifically, we assume that decreasing levels of cooperation lead to an increase in reward strength, while increasing levels of cooperation result in a decrease in reward strength. By investigating coevolutionary dynamics between population state and reward systems, we find that interior stable coexistence state can emerge in our model, where the levels of cooperation and reward strength remain at constant levels. In addition, we also reveal that the emergence of a full cooperation state only requires a minimal level of reward strength. Our study highlights the potential of adaptive feedback reward as a tool for achieving long-term stability and sustainability in social dilemmas.