Nuclear Reactor Safeguarding with Neutrino Detection for MOX Loading Verification

TL;DR

This paper proposes a neutrino detection method with a statistical test to verify MOX fuel loading in nuclear reactors, enabling non-intrusive monitoring of potential plutonium diversion over extended periods.

Contribution

It introduces a simple quantitative statistical test for neutrino data analysis to monitor reactor fuel composition and detect diversion of plutonium in a semi-cooperative setting.

Findings

Detects ~80kg plutonium diversion with 95% confidence in 540 days

Uses a moderate-sized neutrino detector placed 25m from the reactor

Effective for monitoring fuel diversion independent of inspections

Abstract

The resurgence of interest in nuclear power around the world highlights the importance of effective methods to safeguard against nuclear proliferation. Many powerful safeguarding techniques have been developed and are currently employed, but new approaches are needed to address proliferation challenges from emerging advanced reactor designs and fuel cycles. Building on prior work that demonstrated monitoring of nuclear reactor operation using neutrino detectors, we develop and present a simple quantitative statistical test suitable for analysis of measured reactor neutrino data and demonstrate its efficacy in a semi-cooperative reactor monitoring scenario. In this approach, a moderate-sized neutrino detector is placed near the reactor site to help monitor possible MOX fuel diversion independent of inspection-based monitoring. We take advantage of differing time-dependent neutrino count rates during the operating cycle of a reactor core to monitor any deviations of measurements from expectations given a declared fuel composition. For a five-ton idealized detector placed 25m away from a hypothetical 3565 MWth reactor, the statistical test is capable of detecting the diversion of ~80kg plutonium at the 95% confidence level 90% of the time over a 540-day observation period.