Achieving Social Optimum and Budget Balance via a Joint Electricity-Carbon Pricing Mechanism

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel joint electricity-carbon pricing mechanism that ensures budget balance, incentivizes truthful participation, and achieves a socially optimal, carbon-aware dispatch in power markets.

Contribution

It proposes a primal-dual based pricing mechanism that meets all key market requirements and outperforms existing methods in reducing emissions and maintaining market stability.

Findings

Mechanism guarantees budget balance and incentive compatibility.

Numerical results show improved emission reduction.

Mechanism promotes socially optimal dispatch.

Abstract

Decarbonizing electric grids is a crucial global endeavor in the pursuit of carbon neutrality. Taking carbon emissions from generation into account when pricing electricity usage is an essential way to achieve this goal. However, such pricing is not trivial due to the requirements of an effective electricity market, such as maintaining budget balance, providing incentives to motivate participants to follow the dispatch schedule, and minimizing the impact on affected parties compared to when they were in the traditional electricity market. Although existing joint electricity-carbon pricing mechanisms have shown promising performance in reducing emissions in power networks, they can hardly meet all the requirements. This paper proposes a novel joint electricity-carbon pricing mechanism based on primal-dual optimality condition-enabled transformation. An algorithm for determining the critical market parameter is developed. The proposed pricing mechanism is proven to possess all the desired properties, including budget balance, individual rationality, dispatch-following incentive compatibility, and truthful-bidding incentive compatibility. These properties ensure the proposed mechanism can incentivize market participants to achieve carbon-aware social optimum in a self-organized and sustainable way. Numerical experiments show the advantages of the proposed pricing mechanism compared to the existing marginal-based and carbon emission flow-based pricing mechanisms.