Estimating and Incentivizing Imperfect-Knowledge Agents with Hidden Rewards

TL;DR

This paper studies a complex principal-agent setting where the principal cannot observe the agent's rewards and both parties learn over time, proposing a new estimator and incentive policy with proven theoretical guarantees.

Contribution

It introduces a non-parametric estimator and a data-driven incentive policy for a repeated learning game with hidden rewards, providing finite-sample guarantees and regret bounds.

Findings

Estimator achieves finite-sample consistency.

Principal's regret is rigorously bounded.

Framework applicable to green energy contracts.

Abstract

In practice, incentive providers (i.e., principals) often cannot observe the reward realizations of incentivized agents, which is in contrast to many principal-agent models that have been previously studied. This information asymmetry challenges the principal to consistently estimate the agent's unknown rewards by solely watching the agent's decisions, which becomes even more challenging when the agent has to learn its own rewards. This complex setting is observed in various real-life scenarios ranging from renewable energy storage contracts to personalized healthcare incentives. Hence, it offers not only interesting theoretical questions but also wide practical relevance. This paper explores a repeated adverse selection game between a self-interested learning agent and a learning principal. The agent tackles a multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem to maximize their expected reward plus incentive. On top of the agent's learning, the principal trains a parallel algorithm and faces a trade-off between consistently estimating the agent's unknown rewards and maximizing their own utility by offering adaptive incentives to lead the agent. For a non-parametric model, we introduce an estimator whose only input is the history of principal's incentives and agent's choices. We unite this estimator with a proposed data-driven incentive policy within a MAB framework. Without restricting the type of the agent's algorithm, we prove finite-sample consistency of the estimator and a rigorous regret bound for the principal by considering the sequential externality imposed by the agent. Lastly, our theoretical results are reinforced by simulations justifying applicability of our framework to green energy aggregator contracts.