Enhancing Secret Key Generation in Block Fading Channels using Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces
Hibatallah Alwazani, Anas Chaaban

TL;DR
This paper introduces an RIS-assisted method to improve secret key generation in static or low-entropy wireless channels by inducing randomness, demonstrating enhanced performance over benchmarks through simulations.
Contribution
It proposes a novel RIS-assisted approach to enhance secret key rates in static channels, addressing limitations of traditional physical layer security methods.
Findings
Improved secret key throughput with RIS deployment.
Reduced key mismatch rate in low-entropy environments.
Simulation results validate theoretical performance gains.
Abstract
Physical layer security (PLS) is superior to classical cryptography techniques due to its notion of perfect secrecy and independence to an eavesdropper's computational power. One form of PLS arises when Alice and Bob (the legitimate users) exchange signals to extract a common key from the random common channels. The drawback of extracting keys from wireless channels is the ample dependence on the dynamicity and fluctuations of the radio channel. However, some radio channels are constant such as line of sight (LoS) and can be estimated by Eve (an illegitimate user), or can be quite static in behaviour due to the presence low-mobility users thus restricting the amount of randomness. This in turn lowers the secret key rate (SKR) defined as the number of bits of key generated per channel use. In this work, we aim to address this challenge by using a reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS)…
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Taxonomy
TopicsWireless Communication Security Techniques · Advanced Wireless Communication Technologies · DNA and Biological Computing
