The Vulnerable Nature of Decentralized Governance in DeFi
Maya Dotan, Aviv Yaish, Hsin-Chu Yin, Eytan Tsytkin, Aviv Zohar

TL;DR
This paper investigates the vulnerabilities of decentralized governance in DeFi, revealing low participation, centralization, and transferability issues that threaten platform security and integrity.
Contribution
It uncovers how governance tokens are misused and exploited, highlighting design flaws and potential attack vectors in DeFi governance protocols.
Findings
Low voting participation among users
Voting rates decrease with higher gas prices
Governance is highly centralized and tokens are transferred for short-term gains
Abstract
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) platforms are often governed by Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) which are implemented via governance protocols. Governance tokens are distributed to users of the platform, granting them voting rights in the platform's governance protocol. Many DeFi platforms have already been subject to attacks resulting in the loss of millions of dollars in user funds. In this paper we show that governance tokens are often not used as intended and may be harmful to the security of DeFi platforms. We show that (1) users often do not use governance tokens to vote, (2) that voting rates are negatively correlated to gas prices, (3) voting is very centralized. We explore vulnerabilities in the design of DeFi platform's governance protocols and analyze different governance attacks, focusing on the transferable nature of voting rights via governance tokens.…
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Taxonomy
TopicsBlockchain Technology Applications and Security · FinTech, Crowdfunding, Digital Finance · Sharing Economy and Platforms
