A minimalist account of agency in physics
Ali Barzegar, Emilia Margoni, Daniele Oriti

TL;DR
This paper proposes a minimalist, scalable, and naturalized definition of agency in physics, aiming to bridge strong and weak characterizations and apply across various contexts like quantum mechanics and Bayesianism.
Contribution
It introduces a new middle-ground account of agency that is general, adaptable, and compares favorably with existing theories in physics and philosophy.
Findings
Provides a general definition of agency in physics
Explores extensions and applicability of the account
Positions itself between strong and weak agency theories
Abstract
We adopt a top-down approach to agency aimed at developing a minimalist, scalable and naturalized account of it. After providing a general definition, we explore some possible extensions and refinements, domain of applicability, as well as a comparison with other recent accounts of agency, and possible objections to our proposal. With respect to what we classify as strong (such as Tononi's) and weak (such as Rovelli's) characterizations, our notion of agency situates itself in a middle position - our intent being precisely that of spelling out the advantages of this median account within a variety of contexts, such as the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the debate on the nature of physical laws and Bayesianism.
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Taxonomy
TopicsQuantum Mechanics and Applications · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
