Improving International Climate Policy via Mutually Conditional Binding Commitments

TL;DR

This paper proposes a decentralized Conditional Commitment Mechanism to enhance international climate agreements by promoting conditional cooperation, addressing free-riding, and incentivizing early adoption to improve climate policy effectiveness.

Contribution

It introduces a novel bottom-up mechanism inspired by the National Popular Vote Compact to formalize conditional commitments in climate negotiations.

Findings

Mechanism performed well in AI4ClimateCooperation challenge

Incentivizes early adopters and conditional cooperation

Addresses free-riding in climate agreements

Abstract

The Paris Agreement, considered a significant milestone in climate negotiations, has faced challenges in effectively addressing climate change due to the unconditional nature of most Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). This has resulted in a prevalence of free-riding behavior among major polluters and a lack of concrete conditionality in NDCs. To address this issue, we propose the implementation of a decentralized, bottom-up approach called the Conditional Commitment Mechanism. This mechanism, inspired by the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, offers flexibility and incentives for early adopters, aiming to formalize conditional cooperation in international climate policy. In this paper, we provide an overview of the mechanism, its performance in the AI4ClimateCooperation challenge, and discuss potential real-world implementation aspects. Prior knowledge of the climate mitigation collective action problem, basic economic principles, and game theory concepts are assumed.