The roads to non-individuals (and how not to read their maps)

TL;DR

This paper critically examines the claim that quantum mechanics inherently implies a metaphysics of non-individual objects, arguing that such non-individuality is not mandated by the theory's formalism, ontology, or metaphysical considerations.

Contribution

The paper challenges the common view that quantum mechanics necessitates a metaphysics of non-individuals by analyzing formal, ontological, and metaphysical perspectives.

Findings

Non-individuality is not imposed by the formalism of quantum mechanics.

The ontology of quantum theory does not require non-individual objects.

A metaphysics of non-individuals is not an unavoidable lesson from quantum theory.

Abstract

Ever since its beginnings, standard quantum mechanics has been associated with a metaphysical view according to which the theory deals with non-individual objects, i.e., objects deprived of individuality in some sense of the term. We shall examine the grounds of the claim according to which quantum mechanics is so closely connected with a metaphysics of non-individuals. In particular, we discuss the attempts to learn the required `metaphysical lessons' required by quantum mechanics coming from four distinct roads: from the formalism of the theory, treating separately the case of the physics and the underlying logic; from the ontology of the theory, understood as the furniture of the world according to the theory; and, at last, we analyze whether a metaphysics of non-individuals is indispensable from a purely metaphysical point of view. We argue that neither non-individuality nor individuality is not to be found imposed on us in any of these levels so that it should be seen as a metaphysical addition to the theory, rather than as a lesson from it.