On the (De)centralization of FruitChains
Aikaterini-Panagiota Stouka, Thomas Zacharias

TL;DR
This paper challenges the idea that lower reward variance in FruitChain reduces centralization, showing instead that incentives still favor large pools, leading to a fully centralized mining pool scenario.
Contribution
It provides a formal analysis demonstrating that FruitChain's lower reward variance does not prevent the formation of centralized mining pools, contrary to prior assumptions.
Findings
Lower reward variance does not eliminate pool formation.
A fully centralized equilibrium with one pool exists in FruitChain.
Mining pools are incentivized by cost-sharing, not just reward variance.
Abstract
One of the most important features of blockchain protocols is decentralization, as their main contribution is that they formulate a distributed ledger that will be maintained and extended without the need of a trusted party. Bitcoin has been criticized for its tendency to centralization, as very few pools control the majority of the hashing power. Pass et al. proposed FruitChain [PODC 17] and claimed that this blockchain protocol mitigates the formation of pools by reducing the variance of the rewards in the same way as mining pools, but in a fully decentralized fashion. Many follow up papers consider that the problem of centralization in Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchain systems can be solved via lower rewards' variance, and that in FruitChain the formation of pools is unnecessary. Contrary to the common perception, in this work, we prove that lower variance of the rewards does not…
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