Signal Identification and Entrainment for Practical FMCW Radar Spoofing Attacks

TL;DR

This paper introduces methods for passively estimating FMCW radar parameters and analyzing how malicious actors could use these estimates to track and spoof radars, highlighting potential security vulnerabilities in automotive systems.

Contribution

It presents novel algorithms for estimating and tracking FMCW radar signals under challenging conditions, aiding in understanding and defending against spoofing attacks.

Findings

Algorithms successfully estimate radar parameters in simulations.

Proposed methods enable tracking of radar signals despite Doppler shifts.

Results inform development of countermeasures against spoofing.

Abstract

This paper proposes a method of passively estimating the parameters of frequency-modulated-continuous-wave (FMCW) radar signals with a wide range of structural parameter values and analyzes how a malicious actor could employ such estimates to track and spoof a target radar. When radars are implemented to support automated driver assistance systems, an intelligent spoofer has the potential to substantially disrupt safe navigation by inducing its target to perceive false objects. Such a spoofer must acquire highly accurate estimates of the target radar's chirp sweep, timing, and frequency parameters while additionally tracking and compensating for time and Doppler shifts due to clock errors and relative movement. This is a difficult task for millimeter-wave radars due to severe Doppler shifts and fast sweep rates, especially when the spoofer uses off-the-shelf FMCW equipment. Algorithms and techniques for acquiring and tracking an FMCW radar are proposed and verified through simulation, which will help guide future decisions on appropriate radar spoofing countermeasures.