A Dual Stealthy Backdoor: From Both Spatial and Frequency Perspectives
Yudong Gao, Honglong Chen, Peng Sun, Junjian Li, Anqing Zhang, Zhibo, Wang

TL;DR
This paper introduces DUBA, a dual stealthy backdoor attack that embeds triggers in both spatial and frequency domains, significantly improving attack success and stealthiness against image classifiers.
Contribution
The paper proposes a novel backdoor attack method considering both spatial and frequency domain invisibility, enhancing stealthiness and attack effectiveness over existing methods.
Findings
DUBA achieves higher attack success rates than state-of-the-art methods.
DUBA's triggers are more difficult to detect using current defenses.
Extensive evaluations on four datasets validate DUBA's superior performance.
Abstract
Backdoor attacks pose serious security threats to deep neural networks (DNNs). Backdoored models make arbitrarily (targeted) incorrect predictions on inputs embedded with well-designed triggers while behaving normally on clean inputs. Many works have explored the invisibility of backdoor triggers to improve attack stealthiness. However, most of them only consider the invisibility in the spatial domain without explicitly accounting for the generation of invisible triggers in the frequency domain, making the generated poisoned images be easily detected by recent defense methods. To address this issue, in this paper, we propose a DUal stealthy BAckdoor attack method named DUBA, which simultaneously considers the invisibility of triggers in both the spatial and frequency domains, to achieve desirable attack performance, while ensuring strong stealthiness. Specifically, we first use Discrete…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Anomaly Detection Techniques and Applications
MethodsDiscrete Cosine Transform
