A "Game of Like" : Online Social Network Sharing As Strategic Interaction

TL;DR

This paper models online social network sharing as a strategic game, highlighting the importance of user interactions and proposing refinements to better understand content amplification and echo chambers.

Contribution

It introduces a game-theoretic model of online sharing, integrating strategic interactions and connecting social-epistemological concepts to analyze online behavior.

Findings

Identifies key refinements needed for realistic modeling

Links Keynes's beauty contest to echo chambers

Provides prospects for analytical and empirical validation

Abstract

We argue that behavioral science models of online content-sharing overlook the role of strategic interactions between users. Borrowing from accuracy-nudges studies decision-theoretic models, we propose a basic game model and explore special cases with idealized parameter settings to identify refinements necessary to capture real-world online social network behavior. Anticipating those refinements, we sketch a strategic analysis of content amplification and draw a connection between Keynes's beauty contest analogy and recent social-epistemological work on echo chambers. We conclude on the model's prospects from analytical and empirical perspectives.