Intrusion Resilience Systems for Modern Vehicles
Ali Shoker, Vincent Rahli, Jeremie Decouchant, Paulo Esteves-Verissimo

TL;DR
This paper proposes Vehicular Intrusion Resilience Systems (IRS) that enhance safety by enabling critical vehicle applications to tolerate faults and zero-day attacks through Byzantine agreement protocols over multiple ECUs.
Contribution
It introduces IRS as a novel approach for vehicle security that leverages replicated state machines and Byzantine agreement, adapting to modern vehicular architectures.
Findings
IRS can run over existing vehicle networks with feasible latency
Evaluation shows compatibility with automotive applications
Modern architectures support intrusion resilience solutions
Abstract
Current vehicular Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems either incur high false-positive rates or do not capture zero-day vulnerabilities, leading to safety-critical risks. In addition, prevention is limited to few primitive options like dropping network packets or extreme options, e.g., ECU Bus-off state. To fill this gap, we introduce the concept of vehicular Intrusion Resilience Systems (IRS) that ensures the resilience of critical applications despite assumed faults or zero-day attacks, as long as threat assumptions are met. IRS enables running a vehicular application in a replicated way, i.e., as a Replicated State Machine, over several ECUs, and then requiring the replicated processes to reach a form of Byzantine agreement before changing their local state. Our study rides the mutation of modern vehicular environments, which are closing the gap between simple and…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsVehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) · Mobile Ad Hoc Networks · Network Security and Intrusion Detection
