An Analysis of Untargeted Poisoning Attack and Defense Methods for Federated Online Learning to Rank Systems
Shuyi Wang, Guido Zuccon

TL;DR
This paper investigates the vulnerabilities of federated online learning to rank systems against poisoning attacks and evaluates defense strategies to maintain search effectiveness.
Contribution
It provides a comprehensive analysis of attack and defense methods for FOLTR, highlighting key factors affecting their success and impact.
Findings
Poisoning attacks significantly degrade FOLTR effectiveness
Certain defense methods can mitigate attack impacts effectively
Key factors influence the success of attacks and defenses
Abstract
Federated online learning to rank (FOLTR) aims to preserve user privacy by not sharing their searchable data and search interactions, while guaranteeing high search effectiveness, especially in contexts where individual users have scarce training data and interactions. For this, FOLTR trains learning to rank models in an online manner -- i.e. by exploiting users' interactions with the search systems (queries, clicks), rather than labels -- and federatively -- i.e. by not aggregating interaction data in a central server for training purposes, but by training instances of a model on each user device on their own private data, and then sharing the model updates, not the data, across a set of users that have formed the federation. Existing FOLTR methods build upon advances in federated learning. While federated learning methods have been shown effective at training machine learning models…
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Taxonomy
TopicsPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in Data · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
