Online Coalition Formation under Random Arrival or Coalition Dissolution
Martin Bullinger, Ren\'e Romen

TL;DR
This paper studies online coalition formation with agents arriving sequentially, analyzing algorithms' competitive ratios under random arrival and coalition dissolution, improving upon basic models by achieving near-optimal performance.
Contribution
It introduces new algorithms and bounds for online coalition formation, including models with random arrival and coalition dissolution, achieving near-optimal competitive ratios.
Findings
Greedy algorithm achieves optimal ratio in basic model.
Random arrival model reduces ratio to Θ(1/n^2).
Waiting-greedy algorithm improves ratio to Θ(1/n).
Abstract
Coalition formation explores how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. We consider a cardinal utility model with an additively separable aggregation of preferences and study the online variant of coalition formation, where the agents arrive in sequence. The goal is to achieve competitive social welfare. In the basic model, agents arrive in an arbitrary order and have to be assigned to coalitions immediately and irrevocably. There, the natural greedy algorithm is known to achieve an optimal competitive ratio, which heavily relies on the range of utilities. We complement this result by considering two related models. First, we study a model where agents arrive in a random order. We find that the competitive ratio of the greedy algorithm is . In contrast, an alternative algorithm, which is based on…
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