Sketching a Model on Fisheries Enforcement and Compliance -- A Survey

TL;DR

This paper surveys how enforcement costs and imperfections influence fishing firms' behavior and fisheries management, integrating bio-economic models with crime theory to highlight enforcement's role.

Contribution

It introduces a formal model combining bio-economic fisheries management with crime and punishment theory to analyze enforcement impacts.

Findings

Enforcement imperfections affect fishing effort and compliance.

Costly enforcement influences fishery sustainability.

The model provides insights into policy design for better enforcement.

Abstract

Monitoring and enforcement considerations have been largely forgotten in the study of fishery management. This paper discusses this issue through a model formalization to show the impacts of costly, imperfect enforcement of law on the behavior of fishing firms and fisheries management. Theoretical analysis merges a standard bio-economic model of fisheries (Gordon-Schaefer) with Becker theory of Crime and Punishment.