TimeClave: Oblivious In-enclave Time series Processing System
K. Bagher, S. Cui, X. Yuan, C. Rudolph, X. Yi

TL;DR
TimeClave is a secure, efficient system for processing sensitive time series data in cloud environments, using Intel SGX and a novel oblivious RAM to minimize overhead and protect access patterns.
Contribution
It introduces RoORAM, a non-blocking, read-optimized ORAM, and demonstrates a fully oblivious, high-performance time series processing system inside SGX enclaves.
Findings
Achieves 0.03ms point query latency
Handles 22K queries per second
Outperforms baseline ORAM by up to 2.5x in latency
Abstract
Cloud platforms are widely adopted by many systems, such as time series processing systems, to store and process massive amounts of sensitive time series data. Unfortunately, several incidents have shown that cloud platforms are vulnerable to internal and external attacks that lead to critical data breaches. Adopting cryptographic protocols such as homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation adds high computational and network overhead to query operations. We present TimeClave, a fully oblivious in-enclave time series processing system: TimeClave leverages Intel SGX to support aggregate statistics on time series with minimal memory consumption inside the enclave. To hide the access pattern inside the enclave, we introduce a non-blocking read-optimised ORAM named RoORAM. TimeClave integrates RoORAM to obliviously and securely handle client queries with high performance.…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsCryptography and Data Security · Cloud Data Security Solutions · Distributed systems and fault tolerance
