Divide-and-rule policy in the Naming Game
Cheng Ma, Brendan Cross, Gyorgy Korniss, Boleslaw K. Szymanski

TL;DR
This paper extends the Naming Game model to multiple opinions, analyzing how a dominant opinion emerges through phase transitions in large populations and random networks, using mean-field theory and simulations.
Contribution
It introduces a recursive formula for multi-opinion evolution and explores the critical threshold for opinion dominance in complex networks.
Findings
Largest committed group triggers phase transition
Critical size leads to opinion dominance
Recursive formula enables analysis of any scenario
Abstract
The Naming Game is a classic model for studying the emergence and evolution of language within a population. In this paper, we extend the traditional Naming Game model to encompass multiple committed opinions and investigate the system dynamics on the complete graph with an arbitrarily large population and random networks of finite size. For the fully connected complete graph, the homogeneous mixing condition enables us to use mean-field theory to analyze the opinion evolution of the system. However, when the number of opinions increases, the number of variables describing the system grows exponentially. To mitigate this, we focus on a special scenario where the largest group of committed agents competes with a motley of committed groups, each of which is smaller than the largest one, while initially, most of uncommitted agents hold one unique opinion. This scenario is chosen for its…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Complex Network Analysis Techniques · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
