Capacity Bounds for Identification With Effective Secrecy

TL;DR

This paper establishes tight upper bounds on the identification capacity of discrete memoryless wiretap channels under semantic secrecy and stealth constraints, improving previous bounds by applying a prefix channel approach.

Contribution

It introduces a new upper bound for identification capacity with effective secrecy, enhancing previous bounds through a prefix channel method, and provides conditions for tightness.

Findings

Bounds are tight if the legitimate channel is more capable than the eavesdropper's.

The bounds improve upon previous results for identification with secrecy.

An illustrative example demonstrates the bounds on a specific wiretap channel.

Abstract

An upper bound to the identification capacity of discrete memoryless wiretap channels is derived under the requirement of semantic effective secrecy, combining semantic secrecy and stealth constraints. A previously established lower bound is improved by applying it to a prefix channel, formed by concatenating an auxiliary channel and the actual channel. The bounds are tight if the legitimate channel is more capable than the eavesdropper's channel. An illustrative example is provided for a wiretap channel that is composed of a point-to-point channel, and a parallel, reversely degraded wiretap channel. A comparison with results for message transmission and for identification with only secrecy constraint is provided.