Artificial intelligence and biological misuse: Differentiating risks of language models and biological design tools

TL;DR

This paper examines the dual-use risks of AI tools, specifically large language models and biological design tools, highlighting their potential to enable biological misuse and proposing strategies for risk mitigation.

Contribution

It differentiates the biosecurity risks posed by LLMs and BDTs and discusses potential interventions to manage these emerging threats.

Findings

LLMs can lower barriers to biological misuse by providing dual-use information.

BDTs enable creation of more dangerous and targeted pathogens.

Convergence of LLMs and BDTs could significantly increase biosecurity risks.

Abstract

As advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) propel progress in the life sciences, they may also enable the weaponisation and misuse of biological agents. This article differentiates two classes of AI tools that could pose such biosecurity risks: large language models (LLMs) and biological design tools (BDTs). LLMs, such as GPT-4 and its successors, might provide dual-use information and thus remove some barriers encountered by historical biological weapons efforts. As LLMs are turned into multi-modal lab assistants and autonomous science tools, this will increase their ability to support non-experts in performing laboratory work. Thus, LLMs may in particular lower barriers to biological misuse. In contrast, BDTs will expand the capabilities of sophisticated actors. Concretely, BDTs may enable the creation of pandemic pathogens substantially worse than anything seen to date and could enable forms of more predictable and targeted biological weapons. In combination, the convergence of LLMs and BDTs could raise the ceiling of harm from biological agents and could make them broadly accessible. A range of interventions would help to manage risks. Independent pre-release evaluations could help understand the capabilities of models and the effectiveness of safeguards. Options for differentiated access to such tools should be carefully weighed with the benefits of openly releasing systems. Lastly, essential for mitigating risks will be universal and enhanced screening of gene synthesis products.