Fair integer programming under dichotomous and cardinal preferences
Tom Demeulemeester, Dries Goossens, Ben Hermans, Roel Leus

TL;DR
This paper introduces a unified framework for fair decision-making in integer linear programs with binary decision variables representing agents with dichotomous or cardinal preferences, ensuring fair solution selection.
Contribution
It develops algorithms for fair solution selection, extending to cardinal preferences, and evaluates their performance on kidney exchange and scheduling problems.
Findings
Nash product and minimum probability methods outperform others on welfare criteria.
Random Serial Dictatorship offers a good balance of fairness and computational efficiency.
Framework is explainable and adaptable to different preference types.
Abstract
One cannot make truly fair decisions using integer linear programs unless one controls the selection probabilities of the (possibly many) optimal solutions. For this purpose, we propose a unified framework when binary decision variables represent agents with dichotomous preferences, who only care about whether they are selected in the final solution. We develop several general-purpose algorithms to fairly select optimal solutions, for example, by maximizing the Nash product or the minimum selection probability, or by using a random ordering of the agents as a selection criterion (Random Serial Dictatorship). We also discuss in detail how to extend the proposed methods when agents have cardinal preferences. As such, we embed the black-box procedure of solving an integer linear program into a framework that is explainable from start to finish. Lastly, we evaluate the proposed methods on…
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Taxonomy
TopicsExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications
