Proof of reserves and non-double spends for Chaumian Mints
Cyril Grunspan, Ricardo Perez-Marco

TL;DR
This paper proposes a protocol for Chaumian Mints that enables public verification of reserves and prevents double spending, enhancing trustworthiness in digital cash systems.
Contribution
It introduces a novel proof of reserves and non-double spend protocol for Chaumian Mints, addressing trust issues in e-cash systems.
Findings
Protocol allows public auditing of reserves.
Ensures non-double spending in e-cash systems.
Enhances security and trust in digital cash implementations.
Abstract
E-cash was invented in 1982 by David Chaum as an anonymous cryptographic electronic cash system based on blind signatures. It is not a decentralized form of money as Bitcoin. It requires trust on the server or Mint issuing the e-cash tokens and validating the transactions for preventing double spends. Moreover, the users also need to trust the Mint to not debase the value of e-cash tokens by Minting an uncontrolled number. In particular, this is critical for e-cash tokens representing a note of another asset as a currency, or bitcoin, or another cryptocurrency. Thus it would be suitable to implement a public auditing system providing a proof of reserves that ensures that the Mint is not engaging into a fractional reserve system. In this article we describe how to implement a proof of reserves system for Chaumian Mints. The protocol also provides a proof of non-double spends.
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Taxonomy
TopicsBlockchain Technology Applications and Security
