Misinformation as Information Pollution

TL;DR

This paper proposes viewing misinformation as a form of information pollution and suggests implementing a Pigouvian tax to incentivize social media platforms to reduce misinformation spread, drawing parallels with environmental pollution policies.

Contribution

It introduces the concept of a Pigouvian misinformation tax as a novel economic approach to combat misinformation on social media platforms.

Findings

Misinformation can be modeled as information pollution.

A Pigouvian tax could incentivize platforms to reduce misinformation.

The paper discusses key questions for implementing such a tax.

Abstract

Social media feed algorithms are designed to optimize online social engagements for the purpose of maximizing advertising profits, and therefore have an incentive to promote controversial posts including misinformation. By thinking about misinformation as information pollution, we can draw parallels with environmental policy for countering pollution such as carbon taxes. Similar to pollution, a Pigouvian tax on misinformation provides economic incentives for social media companies to control the spread of misinformation more effectively to avoid or reduce their misinformation tax, while preserving some degree of freedom in platforms' response. In this paper, we highlight a bird's eye view of a Pigouvian misinformation tax and discuss the key questions and next steps for implementing such a taxing scheme.