Risk aversion can promote cooperation
Jay Armas, Wout Merbis, Janusz Meylahn, Soroush Rafiee Rad, Mauricio, J. del Razo

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new framework combining reaction networks, quantum mechanics, and game theory to model social dilemmas, demonstrating that risk aversion can foster cooperation and lead to new equilibria in population games.
Contribution
It presents a novel, robust mechanism for cooperation based on risk aversion, integrating interdisciplinary methods to explain cooperative behavior in complex systems.
Findings
Risk aversion promotes cooperation in social dilemma games.
New equilibria emerge due to the risk-averse strategy.
The framework is applicable to various population games.
Abstract
Cooperative dynamics are central to our understanding of many phenomena in living and complex systems. However, we lack a universal mechanism to explain the emergence of cooperation. We present a novel framework for modelling social dilemma games with an arbitrary number of players by combining reaction networks, methods from quantum mechanics applied to stochastic complex systems, game theory and stochastic simulations of molecular reactions. Using this framework, we propose a novel and robust mechanism for cooperation based on risk aversion that leads to cooperative behaviour in population games. Rather than individuals seeking to maximise payouts in the long run, individuals seek to obtain a minimum set of resources with a given level of confidence and in a limited time span. We show that this mechanism can lead to the emergence of new equilibria in a range of social dilemma games.
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Plant and animal studies
