Calibrating Chevron for Preemption
Gregory M. Dickinson

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the Supreme Court's approach to deference in agency interpretations related to federal preemption, proposing a variable deference model that adapts to congressional intent and enhances predictability.
Contribution
It offers a detailed analysis of recent decisions and introduces a novel variable deference rule tailored to congressional intent in preemption cases.
Findings
The Court shows hesitancy to adopt uniform rules due to federalism concerns.
Congressional intent varies, affecting deference decisions.
Proposed variable deference aligns with congressional delegation levels.
Abstract
Now almost three decades since its seminal Chevron decision, the Supreme Court has yet to articulate how that case's doctrine of deference to agency statutory interpretations relates to one of the most compelling federalism issues of our time: regulatory preemption of state law. Should courts defer to preemptive agency interpretations under Chevron, or do preemption's federalism implications demand a less deferential approach? Commentators have provided no shortage of possible solutions, but thus far the Court has resisted all of them. This Article makes two contributions to the debate. First, through a detailed analysis of the Court's recent agency-preemption decisions, I trace its hesitancy to adopt any of the various proposed rules to its high regard for congressional intent where areas of traditional state sovereignty are at risk. Recognizing that congressional intent to delegate…
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Taxonomy
TopicsLegal and Constitutional Studies · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Legal Systems and Judicial Processes
