A Mechanism for Participatory Budgeting With Funding Constraints and Project Interactions

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel participatory budgeting mechanism that accounts for project interactions and funding constraints, extending existing models to better reflect practical voting scenarios and analyzing their strategic and computational properties.

Contribution

It proposes a new preference elicitation scheme for project interactions and generalizes the aggregation model to 1-laminar funding constraints, maintaining strategyproofness under certain conditions.

Findings

Strategyproofness holds under 1-laminar funding constraints.

Preference aggregation for project interactions is NP-hard.

A fixed parameter tractable algorithm is provided for social welfare maximization.

Abstract

Participatory budgeting (PB) has been widely adopted and has attracted significant research efforts; however, there is a lack of mechanisms for PB which elicit project interactions, such as substitution and complementarity, from voters. Also, the outcomes of PB in practice are subject to various minimum/maximum funding constraints on 'types' of projects. We propose a novel preference elicitation scheme for PB which allows voters to express how their utilities from projects within 'groups' interact. We consider preference aggregation done under minimum and maximum funding constraints on 'types' of projects, where a project can have multiple type labels as long as this classification can be defined by a 1-laminar structure (henceforth called 1-laminar funding constraints). Overall, we extend the Knapsack voting model of Goel et al. [26] in two ways - enriching the preference elicitation scheme to include project interactions and generalizing the preference aggregation scheme to include 1-laminar funding constraints. We show that the strategyproofness results of Goel et al. [26] for Knapsack voting continue to hold under 1-laminar funding constraints. Moreover, when the funding constraints cannot be described by a 1-laminar structure, strategyproofness does not hold. Although project interactions often break the strategyproofness, we study a special case of vote profiles where truthful voting is a Nash equilibrium under substitution project interactions. We then study the computational complexity of preference aggregation. Social welfare maximization under project interactions is NP-hard. As a workaround for practical instances, we give a fixed parameter tractable (FPT) algorithm for social welfare maximization with respect to the maximum number of projects in a group when the overall budget is specified in a fixed number of bits.