Relay Mining: Incentivizing Full Non-Validating Nodes Servicing All RPC Types
Daniel Olshansky, Ramiro Rodr\'iguez Colmeiro

TL;DR
Relay Mining introduces a scalable, crypto-economic system that incentivizes full non-validating nodes to service all RPC types in permissionless networks, enhancing decentralization and reducing reliance on centralized providers.
Contribution
The paper presents a novel cryptographic and economic framework enabling multiple RPC providers to service requests in a permissionless setting, using new proof schemes and dynamic rate limiting.
Findings
Proposes a new ClosestMerkleProof scheme for proof-of-inclusion.
Demonstrates a scalable incentive mechanism for RPC servicing.
Integrates rate limiting with crypto-economic incentives.
Abstract
Relay Mining presents a scalable solution employing probabilistic mechanisms, crypto-economic incentives, and new cryptographic primitives to estimate and prove the volume of Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs) made from a client to a server. Distributed ledgers are designed to secure permissionless state transitions (writes), highlighting a gap for incentivizing full non-validating nodes to service non-transactional (read) RPCs. This leads applications to have a dependency on altruistic or centralized off-chain Node RPC Providers. We present a solution that enables multiple RPC providers to service requests from independent applications on a permissionless network. We leverage digital signatures, commit-and-reveal schemes, and Sparse Merkle Sum Tries (SMSTs) to prove the amount of work done. This is enabled through the introduction of a novel ClosestMerkleProof proof-of-inclusion scheme. A…
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Taxonomy
TopicsPeer-to-Peer Network Technologies · Cooperative Communication and Network Coding · Game Theory and Applications
