DNN-Defender: A Victim-Focused In-DRAM Defense Mechanism for Taming Adversarial Weight Attack on DNNs
Ranyang Zhou, Sabbir Ahmed, Adnan Siraj Rakin, Shaahin Angizi

TL;DR
DNN-Defender is a novel DRAM-based victim-focused defense mechanism that protects quantized DNNs from targeted RowHammer attacks without accuracy loss or hardware overhead.
Contribution
It introduces the first in-DRAM swapping defense tailored for quantized DNNs, effectively mitigating targeted bit-flip attacks with minimal overhead.
Findings
High protection level against RowHammer attacks
No accuracy drop on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets
No additional hardware overhead
Abstract
With deep learning deployed in many security-sensitive areas, machine learning security is becoming progressively important. Recent studies demonstrate attackers can exploit system-level techniques exploiting the RowHammer vulnerability of DRAM to deterministically and precisely flip bits in Deep Neural Networks (DNN) model weights to affect inference accuracy. The existing defense mechanisms are software-based, such as weight reconstruction requiring expensive training overhead or performance degradation. On the other hand, generic hardware-based victim-/aggressor-focused mechanisms impose expensive hardware overheads and preserve the spatial connection between victim and aggressor rows. In this paper, we present the first DRAM-based victim-focused defense mechanism tailored for quantized DNNs, named DNN-Defender that leverages the potential of in-DRAM swapping to withstand the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Security and Verification in Computing · Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
MethodsFLIP
