Novel bribery mining attacks in the bitcoin system and the bribery miner's dilemma
Junjie Hu, Chunxiang Xu, Zhe Jiang, Jiwu Cao

TL;DR
This paper introduces two novel bribery mining attacks in Bitcoin, analyzes their impact on miners' strategies, and proposes mitigation measures, highlighting ongoing challenges in preventing such attacks.
Contribution
It presents new bribery-based mining attacks and analyzes the bribery miner's dilemma, offering insights and mitigation strategies for these advanced threats.
Findings
Bribery semi-selfish mining increases adversary rewards.
Bribery stubborn mining causes target miners to suffer losses.
Proposed mitigation measures can reduce attack effectiveness.
Abstract
Mining attacks allow adversaries to obtain a disproportionate share of the mining reward by deviating from the honest mining strategy in the Bitcoin system. Among them, the most well-known are selfish mining (SM), block withholding (BWH), fork after withholding (FAW) and bribery mining. In this paper, we propose two novel mining attacks: bribery semi-selfish mining (BSSM) and bribery stubborn mining (BSM). Both of them can increase the relative extra reward of the adversary and will make the target bribery miners suffer from the bribery miner dilemma. All targets earn less under the Nash equilibrium. For each target, their local optimal strategy is to accept the bribes. However, they will suffer losses, comparing with denying the bribes. Furthermore, for all targets, their global optimal strategy is to deny the bribes. Quantitative analysis and simulation have been verified our…
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Taxonomy
TopicsBlockchain Technology Applications and Security · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Cybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies
