Strategic flip-flopping in political competition

TL;DR

This paper analyzes how political candidates strategically reposition themselves in response to new voter preference information, balancing the benefits of proximity to the median voter against the costs of adjustment, and predicts divergence in initial positions for strategic advantage.

Contribution

It introduces a game-theoretic model of candidate repositioning with costly adjustments, highlighting equilibrium behaviors and strategic divergence based on anticipated future information.

Findings

Candidates diverge ex-ante to secure cost-less victories when future information is favorable.

Re-positioning is motivated by the trade-off between electoral gains and adjustment costs.

Equilibrium predicts strategic divergence based on anticipated information and costs.

Abstract

We study candidates' positioning when adjustments are possible in response to new information about voters' preferences. Re-positioning allows candidates to get closer to the median voter but is costly both financially and electorally. We examine the occurrence and the direction of the adjustments depending on the ex-ante positions and the new information. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, candidates anticipate the possibility to adjust in response to future information and diverge ex-ante in order to secure a cost-less victory when the new information is favorable.