The optimal reinsurance strategy with price-competition between two reinsurers
Liyuan Lin, Fangda Liu, Jingzhen Liu abd Luyang Yu

TL;DR
This paper models the strategic interactions in reinsurance markets with two reinsurers competing on prices, using a stochastic game framework to derive equilibrium strategies and analyze market dynamics.
Contribution
It introduces a Stackelberg game with a Nash competition between reinsurers, incorporating different premium principles and solving a time-inconsistent control problem.
Findings
Unique equilibrium reinsurance premium strategy for exponential claims
Reinsurance strategies depend on claim size, risk aversion, and interest rates
Numerical results illustrate the impact of market parameters on strategies
Abstract
We study optimal reinsurance in the framework of stochastic game theory, in which there is an insurer and two reinsurers. A Stackelberg model is established to analyze the non-cooperative relationship between the insurer and reinsurers, where the insurer is considered as the follower and the reinsurers are considered as the leaders. The insurer is a price taker who determines reinsurance demand in the reinsurance market, while the reinsurers can price the reinsurance treaties. Our contribution is to use a Nash game to describe the price-competition between two reinsurers. We assume that one of the reinsurers adopts the variance premium principle and the other adopts the expected value premium principle. The insurer and the reinsurers aim to maximize their respective mean-variance cost functions which lead to a time-inconsistency control problem. To overcome the time-inconsistency issue…
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Taxonomy
TopicsInsurance and Financial Risk Management · Insurance, Mortality, Demography, Risk Management · Probability and Risk Models
