Designing Policies for Truth: Combating Misinformation with Transparency and Information Design
Ya-Ting Yang, Tao Li, and Quanyan Zhu

TL;DR
This paper introduces a Bayesian model to design optimal transparency policies for social platforms, demonstrating that fully informative tagging effectively prevents misinformation spread by incentivizing authentic content creation.
Contribution
It develops a novel Bayesian persuasion model for misinformation prevention, showing that transparent tagging is the optimal policy under strategic interactions.
Findings
Fully informative tagging is optimal for misinformation prevention.
Transparency incentivizes authentic content creation.
Model is validated through numerical simulations.
Abstract
Misinformation has become a growing issue on online social platforms (OSPs), especially during elections or pandemics. To combat this, OSPs have implemented various policies, such as tagging, to notify users about potentially misleading information. However, these policies are often transparent and therefore susceptible to being exploited by content creators, who may not be willing to invest effort into producing authentic content, causing the viral spread of misinformation. Instead of mitigating the reach of existing misinformation, this work focuses on a solution of prevention, aiming to stop the spread of misinformation before it has a chance to gain momentum. We propose a Bayesian persuaded branching process () to model the strategic interactions among the OSP, the content creator, and the user. The misinformation spread on OSP is modeled by a multi-type…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsMisinformation and Its Impacts · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Spam and Phishing Detection
