Online Learning for Equilibrium Pricing in Markets under Incomplete Information
Devansh Jalota, Haoyuan Sun, Navid Azizan

TL;DR
This paper develops online algorithms for market equilibrium pricing under incomplete information, achieving near-optimal regret bounds in fixed and varying cost scenarios, with contextual information improving performance.
Contribution
It introduces novel online learning algorithms for equilibrium pricing with incomplete information, including methods that adapt to changing costs using contextual hints.
Findings
Algorithms achieve $O(1)$ regret for constant demand and $O(\sqrt{T})$ for variable demand with fixed costs.
In general, no sublinear regret algorithms exist for varying costs without additional information.
Contextual information enables sublinear regret algorithms in dynamic cost settings.
Abstract
The computation of equilibrium prices at which the supply of goods matches their demand typically relies on complete information on agents' private attributes, e.g., suppliers' cost functions, which are often unavailable in practice. Motivated by this practical consideration, we consider the problem of learning equilibrium prices over a horizon of periods in the incomplete information setting wherein a market operator seeks to satisfy the customer demand for a commodity by purchasing it from competing suppliers with cost functions unknown to the operator. We first consider the setting when suppliers' cost functions are fixed and develop algorithms that, on three pertinent regret metrics, simultaneously achieve a regret of when the customer demand is constant over time, and when the demand varies over time. In the setting when the suppliers' cost functions vary…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Bandit Algorithms Research · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications
