Multi-block MEV

TL;DR

This paper investigates multi-block MEV strategies enabled by Ethereum's pro-poser/builder separation, analyzing builder bidding behavior and its potential for sophisticated transaction manipulation across consecutive blocks.

Contribution

It provides preliminary data and analysis on builder bidding strategies for securing consecutive blocks, highlighting potential for advanced MEV exploitation post-PBS implementation.

Findings

Builders employ super-linear bidding to secure consecutive blocks

Rational bidding increases if profitable for MEV extraction

Preliminary data suggests potential for sophisticated MMEV strategies

Abstract

Multi-block MEV (MMEV) denotes the practice of securing k-consecutive blocks in an attempt at extracting surplus value by manipulating transaction ordering. Following the implementation of pro-poser/builder separation (PBS) on Ethereum, savvy builders can secure consecutive block space by implementing targeted bidding strategies through relays. To estimate the extent to which this practice might be taking place today, we collect data on all bids submitted by builders through relays in the period from the 15th of September (the merge) 2022 until the 31st of January 2023. We hypothesize that builders might secure consecutive blocks in order to deploy sophisticated MMEV strategies, such as creating artificial momentum in Uniswap pools, by withholding and prioritizing transactions from the mempool. In this talk proposal, we present preliminary and non-conclusive results, indicating the builders employ super-linear bidding strategies to secure consecutive block space. We hypothesize that builders act rationally and increase bids only if this is profitable. With this WIP talk proposal, we hope to stimulate an interesting discussion on the feasibility of sophisticated MMEV strategies at SBC23, with the aim of collecting feedback from researchers and practitioners working on MEV.