On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect Rationality
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre

TL;DR
This paper characterizes obviously strategyproof mechanisms for single-parameter agents in optimization problems, revealing they operate via greedy or reverse greedy strategies, and applies this to bounds in scheduling problems.
Contribution
It provides a comprehensive characterization of OSP mechanisms for all single-parameter optimization problems, extending previous binary case results.
Findings
OSP mechanisms are essentially greedy, reverse greedy, or split-domain strategies.
The characterization enables deriving bounds on approximation guarantees.
Application to scheduling problems demonstrates practical implications.
Abstract
The design of algorithms or protocols that are able to align the goals of the planner with the selfish interests of the agents involved in these protocols is of paramount importance in almost every decentralized setting (such as, computer networks, markets, etc.) as shown by the rich literature in Mechanism Design. Recently, huge interest has been devoted to the design of mechanisms for imperfectly rational agents, i.e., mechanisms for which agents are able to easily grasp that there is no action different from following the protocol that would satisfy their interests better. This work has culminated in the definition of Obviously Strategyproof (OSP) Mechanisms, that have been shown to capture the incentives of agents without contingent reasoning skills. Without an understanding of the algorithmic nature of OSP mechanisms, it is hard to assess how well these mechanisms can satisfy the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Game Theory and Voting Systems
