Fair Chore Division under Binary Supermodular Costs
Siddharth Barman, Vishnu V. Narayan, Paritosh Verma

TL;DR
This paper investigates fair division of indivisible chores with binary supermodular costs, establishing existence, algorithms, and limitations for various fairness and efficiency criteria.
Contribution
It introduces new existence results and polynomial-time algorithms for fair and efficient chore allocations under binary supermodular costs, and analyzes their limitations.
Findings
Existence of EF1, MMS, and Lorenz dominating allocations.
Polynomial-time algorithms for these fairness criteria.
Impossibility of approximate EFX Pareto efficient allocations.
Abstract
We study the problem of dividing indivisible chores among agents whose costs (for the chores) are supermodular set functions with binary marginals. Such functions capture complementarity among chores, i.e., they constitute an expressive class wherein the marginal disutility of each chore is either one or zero, and the marginals increase with respect to supersets. In this setting, we study the broad landscape of finding fair and efficient chore allocations. In particular, we establish the existence of EF1 and Pareto efficient chore allocations, MMS-fair and Pareto efficient allocations, and Lorenz dominating chore allocations. Furthermore, we develop polynomial-time algorithms--in the value oracle model--for computing the chore allocations for each of these fairness and efficiency criteria. Complementing these existential and algorithmic results, we show that in this…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems
