The Amplification Paradox in Recommender Systems
Manoel Horta Ribeiro, Veniamin Veselovsky, Robert West

TL;DR
This paper investigates why recommender systems, despite favoring extreme content, do not primarily drive its consumption, by modeling user utility and content nicheness to explain the amplification paradox.
Contribution
It introduces a simple agent-based model demonstrating how user utility and content niche characteristics explain the amplification paradox in recommender systems.
Findings
Recommender systems tend to deamplify niche, extreme content due to low user utility.
The collaborative-filtering nature and niche content characteristics explain the paradox.
Modeling user utility is crucial for understanding algorithmic amplification.
Abstract
Automated audits of recommender systems found that blindly following recommendations leads users to increasingly partisan, conspiratorial, or false content. At the same time, studies using real user traces suggest that recommender systems are not the primary driver of attention toward extreme content; on the contrary, such content is mostly reached through other means, e.g., other websites. In this paper, we explain the following apparent paradox: if the recommendation algorithm favors extreme content, why is it not driving its consumption? With a simple agent-based model where users attribute different utilities to items in the recommender system, we show through simulations that the collaborative-filtering nature of recommender systems and the nicheness of extreme content can resolve the apparent paradox: although blindly following recommendations would indeed lead users to niche…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Spam and Phishing Detection · Auction Theory and Applications
