Why Majority Judgement is not yet the solution for political elections, but can help finding it

TL;DR

This paper critiques the limitations of Majority Judgement in elections and proposes enhancements to better incorporate the full electoral process, including abstentions and reelections, aiming for a more comprehensive and legislatively adaptable voting system.

Contribution

It introduces a novel extension of Majority Judgement that accounts for abstentions and reelections, improving its applicability to real-world electoral processes.

Findings

Enhanced model incorporates abstentions and reelections.

Proposed system aligns incentives for politicians seeking reelection.

Framework can be easily adopted into legislation.

Abstract

Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mathematical model: Elections as problem of choice or ranking. We show how the model can be enhanced to take into account the complete process starting from the whole set of persons having passive electoral rights and even the aspect of reelection. By a new view on abstentions from voting and an adaption of Majority Judgement with three grades, we are able to describe a complete process for an election that can be easily put into legislation and sets suitable incentives for politicians who want to be reelected.