Insight into China's Economically Motivated Adulteration Risk in Online Raw Agricultural Product Sales

TL;DR

This paper develops a game-theoretic model to analyze how online agricultural product sellers in China decide on adulteration and pricing, and how platform policies and penalties can deter adulteration, supported by real-world data from Taobao.

Contribution

It introduces a novel game-theoretic framework for modeling adulteration behavior in online agricultural markets, incorporating seller heterogeneity and platform policies, with empirical calibration using real data.

Findings

Higher platform take rates can reduce adulteration.

Profitable adulteration persists when penalties are low.

Penalty-inspection strategies are effective in deterring EMA.

Abstract

Uncertainty in quality and the inspectors' imperfect testing capability leave raw agricultural products (e.g., fresh produce, seafood, livestock and poultry products, etc.) wide open to economically motivated adulteration (EMA), and the strong demand for online shopping of these products in China makes this situation even worse. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic framework to investigate online raw agricultural product sellers' preemptive EMA behavior on an ecommerce platform (EP). Particularly, the sellers differ from each other in the original quality of their products. We characterize the sellers' equilibrium pricing and adulteration decisions and the EP's optimal take rate decision, and analyze how the sampling inspections and adulteration penalty jointly impact these decisions. Moreover, we investigate three managerial levers, such as claiming a higher-than-law-requires penalty, that the administrative departments or the EP can use to deter EMA. Finally, we use the real-word data from Taobao.com to calibrate our model and derive more managerial insights from the analytical findings. We find that the heterogenous sellers' adulteration decisions are symmetric and their ex-post pricing decisions lead them to evenly share the market on the EP. Interestingly, we show that the EP's higher take rate will inhibit the sellers' adulteration behavior. However, the profit-maximizing EP may indulge the sellers' adulteration behavior by intentionally decreasing this rate. Our results highlight a penalty-inspection-centered approach as essential to combat EMA, and the three levels can play a role as supplements to this approach under certain conditions.