Recommending to Strategic Users
Andreas Haupt, Dylan Hadfield-Menell, Chara Podimata

TL;DR
This paper models strategic user behavior in recommendation systems as a two-stage game, revealing how users influence future recommendations and proposing interventions to improve recommendation quality for diverse users.
Contribution
It introduces a game-theoretic model of strategic consumption in recommendation systems and suggests interventions to mitigate biases and improve recommendations.
Findings
Users tend to accentuate their differences in equilibrium.
Minority content exposure may decrease due to strategic behavior.
Proposed interventions can enhance recommendation fairness and accuracy.
Abstract
Recommendation systems are pervasive in the digital economy. An important assumption in many deployed systems is that user consumption reflects user preferences in a static sense: users consume the content they like with no other considerations in mind. However, as we document in a large-scale online survey, users do choose content strategically to influence the types of content they get recommended in the future. We model this user behavior as a two-stage noisy signalling game between the recommendation system and users: the recommendation system initially commits to a recommendation policy, presents content to the users during a cold start phase which the users choose to strategically consume in order to affect the types of content they will be recommended in a recommendation phase. We show that in equilibrium, users engage in behaviors that accentuate their differences to users of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Media Influence and Politics · Social Media and Politics
