Propositional Logics for the Lawvere Quantale

TL;DR

This paper develops and analyzes three propositional logics over the Lawvere quantale for quantitative metric reasoning, establishing decidability and completeness results, and exploring their limitations and specific conditions for strong completeness.

Contribution

It introduces three new $[0, abla ext{,} abla ext{,} ext{quantale-valued propositional logics,} and proves their decidable completeness and limitations.

Findings

Decidable natural deduction systems for all three logics.

Completeness proven using Motzkin transposition theorem.

Strong completeness holds under specific restrictions.

Abstract

Lawvere showed that generalised metric spaces are categories enriched over $[0, \infty]$, the quantale of the positive extended reals. The statement of enrichment is a quantitative analogue of being a preorder. Towards seeking a logic for quantitative metric reasoning, we investigate three $[0,\infty]$-valued propositional logics over the Lawvere quantale. The basic logical connectives shared by all three logics are those that can be interpreted in any quantale, viz finite conjunctions and disjunctions, tensor (addition for the Lawvere quantale) and linear implication (here a truncated subtraction); to these we add, in turn, the constant $1$ to express integer values, and scalar multiplication by a non-negative real to express general affine combinations. Quantitative equational logic can be interpreted in the third logic if we allow inference systems instead of axiomatic systems. For each of these logics we develop a natural deduction system which we prove to be decidably complete w.r.t. the quantale-valued semantics. The heart of the completeness proof makes use of the Motzkin transposition theorem. Consistency is also decidable; the proof makes use of Fourier-Motzkin elimination of linear inequalities. Strong completeness does not hold in general, even (as is known) for theories over finitely-many propositional variables; indeed even an approximate form of strong completeness in the sense of Pavelka or Ben Yaacov -- provability up to arbitrary precision -- does not hold. However, we can show it for theories axiomatized by a (not necessarily finite) set of judgements in normal form over a finite set of propositional variables when we restrict to models that do not map variables to $\infty$; the proof uses Hurwicz's general form of the Farkas' Lemma.