Combining Tree-Search, Generative Models, and Nash Bargaining Concepts in Game-Theoretic Reinforcement Learning

TL;DR

This paper introduces a scalable deep reinforcement learning framework combining tree search, generative models, and bargaining theory to improve opponent modeling and negotiation in multiagent systems.

Contribution

It proposes Generative Best Response (GenBR), a scalable MCTS-based algorithm with deep generative models, integrated into PSRO for improved opponent modeling in large imperfect information domains.

Findings

GenBR scales to large imperfect information domains.

Agents achieve comparable social welfare and bargaining scores with humans.

Search with generative modeling enhances policy strength and online prediction.

Abstract

Opponent modeling methods typically involve two crucial steps: building a belief distribution over opponents' strategies, and exploiting this opponent model by playing a best response. However, existing approaches typically require domain-specific heurstics to come up with such a model, and algorithms for approximating best responses are hard to scale in large, imperfect information domains. In this work, we introduce a scalable and generic multiagent training regime for opponent modeling using deep game-theoretic reinforcement learning. We first propose Generative Best Respoonse (GenBR), a best response algorithm based on Monte-Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) with a learned deep generative model that samples world states during planning. This new method scales to large imperfect information domains and can be plug and play in a variety of multiagent algorithms. We use this new method under the framework of Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), to automate the generation of an \emph{offline opponent model} via iterative game-theoretic reasoning and population-based training. We propose using solution concepts based on bargaining theory to build up an opponent mixture, which we find identifying profiles that are near the Pareto frontier. Then GenBR keeps updating an \emph{online opponent model} and reacts against it during gameplay. We conduct behavioral studies where human participants negotiate with our agents in Deal-or-No-Deal, a class of bilateral bargaining games. Search with generative modeling finds stronger policies during both training time and test time, enables online Bayesian co-player prediction, and can produce agents that achieve comparable social welfare and Nash bargaining score negotiating with humans as humans trading among themselves.