Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi,, Rebecca Reiffenh\"auser

TL;DR
This paper extends the analysis of the Round-Robin mechanism's equilibria and fairness guarantees beyond additive agents, showing it works for cancelable and submodular valuation functions, including approximate fairness in complex settings.
Contribution
It proves the existence of equilibria and fairness guarantees for the Round-Robin mechanism with broader valuation classes, beyond additive functions.
Findings
Round-Robin has equilibria for cancelable valuations.
Approximate equilibria yield approximately EF1 allocations.
Fairness guarantees extend to submodular valuations, despite non-existence of exact equilibria.
Abstract
Fair allocation of indivisible goods has attracted extensive attention over the last two decades, yielding numerous elegant algorithmic results and producing challenging open questions. The problem becomes much harder in the presence of strategic agents. Ideally, one would want to design truthful mechanisms that produce allocations with fairness guarantees. However, in the standard setting without monetary transfers, it is generally impossible to have truthful mechanisms that provide non-trivial fairness guarantees. Recently, Amanatidis et al. [2021] suggested the study of mechanisms that produce fair allocations in their equilibria. Specifically, when the agents have additive valuation functions, the simple Round-Robin algorithm always has pure Nash equilibria and the corresponding allocations are envy-free up to one good (EF1) with respect to the agents' true valuation functions.…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
