Haves and Have-Nots: A Theory of Economic Sufficientarianism

TL;DR

This paper develops a generalized theory of sufficientarianism for ranking multi-good allocations, introducing the concept of sufficientarian judgment and relating it to the leximin principle, with formal axiomatic analysis.

Contribution

It introduces a novel ethical concept, sufficientarian judgment, and establishes its equivalence with sufficientarianism, symmetry, and separability in multi-good economic contexts.

Findings

Sufficientarian judgment is closely related to the leximin principle.

The axioms are analyzed in both abstract and specific economic environments.

Sufficientarianism can be characterized through these axioms and concepts.

Abstract

We introduce a generalization of the concept of sufficientarianism, intended to rank allocations involving multiple consumption goods. In ranking allocations of goods for a fixed society of agents, sufficientarianism posits that allocations are compared according to the number of individuals whose consumption is deemed sufficient. We base our analysis on a novel ethical concept, which we term sufficientarian judgment. Sufficientarian judgment asserts that if in starting from an allocation in which all agents have identical consumption, a change in one agent's consumption hurts society, then there is no change in any other agent's consumption which could subsequently benefit society. Sufficientarianism is shown to be equivalent to sufficientarian judgment, symmetry, and separability. We investigate our axioms in an abstract environment, and in specific economic environments. Finally, we argue formally that sufficientarian judgment is closely related to the leximin principle.