Tight Bounds on 3-Team Manipulations in Randomized Death Match
Atanas Dinev, S. Matthew Weinberg

TL;DR
This paper provides a tight bound on the ability of three teams to manipulate outcomes in a randomized tournament rule called Randomized Death Match, advancing understanding of strategic vulnerabilities in tournament design.
Contribution
It establishes the first tight analysis of manipulation bounds for three teams in a Condorcet-consistent tournament rule, specifically for Randomized Death Match.
Findings
Randomized Death Match is 3-SNM-(31/60), tight for this rule.
The analysis explicitly identifies the most-manipulable tournament configuration.
The rule disincentivizes Sybil attacks as the number of Sybils increases.
Abstract
Consider a round-robin tournament on n teams, where a winner must be (possibly randomly) selected as a function of the results from the pairwise matches. A tournament rule is said to be k-SNM- if no set of k teams can ever manipulate the pairwise matches between them to improve 2 the joint probability that one of these k teams wins by more than . Prior work identifies multiple simple tournament rules that are 2-SNM-1/3 (Randomized Single Elimination Bracket [SSW17], Randomized King of the Hill [SWZZ20], Randomized Death Match [DW21]), which is optimal for k = 2 among all Condorcet-consistent rules (that is, rules that select an undefeated team with probability 1). Our main result establishes that Randomized Death Match is 3-SNM-(31/60), which is tight (for Randomized Death Match). This is the first tight analysis of any…
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Taxonomy
TopicsExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems
