Evolutionary dynamics under periodic switching of update rules on regular networks
Shengxian Wang, Weijia Yao, Ming Cao, Xiaojie Chen

TL;DR
This paper investigates how periodic switching of strategy update rules on regular networks influences the emergence of cooperation in evolutionary games, providing a theoretical framework and validating results through numerical examples.
Contribution
It introduces a novel theoretical framework using switched system theory to analyze the effects of periodically switching update rules on cooperation.
Findings
Periodic switching can promote cooperation under certain conditions.
Theoretical conditions for cooperation emergence are derived and validated.
Numerical examples confirm the effectiveness of switching strategies.
Abstract
Microscopic strategy update rules play an important role in the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation among interacting agents on complex networks. Many previous related works only consider one \emph{fixed} rule, while in the real world, individuals may switch, sometimes periodically, between rules. It is of particular theoretical interest to investigate under what conditions the periodic switching of strategy update rules facilitates the emergence of cooperation. To answer this question, we study the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on regular networks where agents can periodically switch their strategy update rules. We accordingly develop a theoretical framework of this periodically switched system, where the replicator equation corresponding to each specific microscopic update rule is used for describing the subsystem, and all the subsystems are activated in sequence. By utilizing…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
