Finding Nontrivial Minimum Fixed Points in Discrete Dynamical Systems
Zirou Qiu, Chen Chen, Madhav V. Marathe, S. S. Ravi, Daniel J., Rosenkrantz, Richard E. Stearns, Anil Vullikanti

TL;DR
This paper investigates the computational challenge of finding minimal fixed points in discrete dynamical systems, especially in network contagion models, and proposes algorithms and heuristics for practical solutions.
Contribution
It formulates a new optimization problem for minimal fixed points, proves its computational hardness, and offers efficient solutions for special cases and heuristic methods for larger networks.
Findings
Hardness of approximation established unless P=NP
Efficient solutions for special cases identified
Heuristics show effectiveness on real-world networks
Abstract
Networked discrete dynamical systems are often used to model the spread of contagions and decision-making by agents in coordination games. Fixed points of such dynamical systems represent configurations to which the system converges. In the dissemination of undesirable contagions (such as rumors and misinformation), convergence to fixed points with a small number of affected nodes is a desirable goal. Motivated by such considerations, we formulate a novel optimization problem of finding a nontrivial fixed point of the system with the minimum number of affected nodes. We establish that, unless P = NP, there is no polynomial time algorithm for approximating a solution to this problem to within the factor n^1-\epsilon for any constant epsilon > 0. To cope with this computational intractability, we identify several special cases for which the problem can be solved efficiently. Further, we…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
