Runaway signals: Exaggerated displays of commitment may result from second-order signaling

TL;DR

This paper introduces a model called the signal runaway game to explain how second-order signals like outrage can stabilize uniform, costly displays of commitment within groups, leading to exaggerated and extreme signaling behaviors.

Contribution

The paper presents a novel model demonstrating how second-order signaling can cause runaway costs and stabilize uniform commitment displays in groups.

Findings

Outrage functions as a second-order signal that stabilizes uniform signals.

Second-order signaling can lead to runaway costs in group displays.

Model and simulation show how outrage increases signal visibility and costs.

Abstract

To demonstrate their commitment, for instance during wartime, members of a group will sometimes all engage in the same ruinous display. Such uniform, high-cost signals are hard to reconcile with standard models of signaling. For signals to be stable, they should honestly inform their audience; yet, uniform signals are trivially uninformative. To explain this phenomenon, we design a simple model, which we call the signal runaway game. In this game, senders can express outrage at non-senders. Outrage functions as a second-order signal. By expressing outrage at non-senders, senders draw attention to their own signal, and benefit from its increased visibility. Using our model and a simulation, we show that outrage can stabilize uniform signals, and can lead signal costs to run away. Second-order signaling may explain why groups sometimes demand displays of commitment from all their members, and why these displays can entail extreme costs.